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How do independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock

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  • Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn
  • Jiraporn, Pornsit
  • Treepongkaruna, Sirimon

Abstract

Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a quasi-natural experiment, we explore how independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs. Generalist CEOs possess the general managerial skills that can be applied across firms and industries. Our difference-in-difference estimates show that independent directors view generalist CEOs unfavorably. Firms forced to raise board independence experience a lower increase in CEO general ability than those not required to change board composition. Additional analysis confirms the results, including fixed- and random-effects regressions, propensity score matching, instrumental-variable analysis, and Oster's (2019) technique for testing coefficient stability.

Suggested Citation

  • Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Treepongkaruna, Sirimon, 2021. "How do independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:78:y:2021:i:c:s1057521921002775
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101957
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Generalist CEOs; Specialist CEOs; Independent directors; Board independence; Corporate governance; Sarbanes-Oxley;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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