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How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

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  • Jiraporn, Pornsit
  • Jumreornvong, Seksak
  • Jiraporn, Napatsorn
  • Singh, Simran

Abstract

Prior research shows that powerful CEOs can exacerbate the agency conflict, resulting in adverse corporate outcomes. Exploiting an exogenous shock introduced by the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, we explore whether board independence mitigates CEO power. Based on difference-in-difference estimation, our evidence shows that independent directors view powerful CEOs unfavorably. Board independence diminishes CEO power by more than a quarter. Based on a quasi-natural experiment, our research design is less vulnerable to the omitted-variable bias and reverse causality and therefore suggests that the effect of board independence on CEO power is likely causal.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiraporn, Pornsit & Jumreornvong, Seksak & Jiraporn, Napatsorn & Singh, Simran, 2016. "How do independent directors view powerful CEOs? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(C), pages 268-274.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:16:y:2016:i:c:p:268-274
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2015.12.008
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    Cited by:

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    2. Muhammad Safdar Sial & Chunmei Zheng & Nguyen Vinh Khuong & Tehmina Khan & Muhammad Usman, 2018. "Does Firm Performance Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting of Chinese Listed Companies?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-12, June.
    3. Barros, Victor & Guedes, Maria João & Santos, Pedro & Sarmento, Joaquim Miranda, 2022. "Does CEO turnover influence dividend policy?," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    4. Hasan, Iftekhar & Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kowalewski, Oskar & Kozłowski, Łukasz, 2023. "Cultural values of parent bank board members and lending by foreign subsidiaries: The moderating role of personal traits," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    5. Chindasombatcharoen, Pongsapak & Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2023. "Corporate culture, cultural diversification, and independent directors: Evidence from earnings conference calls," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).
    6. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Treepongkaruna, Sirimon, 2021. "How do independent directors view generalist vs. specialist CEOs? Evidence from an exogenous regulatory shock," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    7. Vijaya Subrahmanyam & Manohar Singh & Anita Pennathur, 2020. "CEO characteristics, firm performance, and corporate political contributions: A firm level pre‐Citizens United analysis," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 38(2), pages 379-404, April.
    8. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Kijkasiwat, Ploypailin & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Lee, Sang Mook, 2023. "Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and independent directors: A quasi-natural experiment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 358-368.
    9. Usman, Muhammad & Zhang, Junrui & Farooq, Muhammad Umar & Makki, Muhammad Abdul Majid & Dong, Nanyan, 2018. "Female directors and CEO power," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 44-47.
    10. Junaid Haider & Hong-Xing Fang, 2018. "CEO power, corporate risk taking and role of large shareholders," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(1), pages 55-72, April.
    11. Xinfeng Jiang & Ahsan Akbar, 2018. "Does Increased Representation of Female Executives Improve Corporate Environmental Investment? Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(12), pages 1-19, December.
    12. Plaksina, Yulia & Gallagher, Liam & Dowling, Michael, 2019. "CEO social status and M&A decision making," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 282-300.
    13. Ongsakul, Viput & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2019. "How do independent directors view powerful executive risk-taking incentives? A quasi-natural experiment," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 31(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Independent directors; Independent boards; Board independence; CEO power; Powerful CEOs; Sarbanes–Oxley Act;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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