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The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance

Editor

Listed:
  • Wright, Mike
    (Professor of Entrepreneurship, Imperial College Business School and University of Ghent)

  • Siegel, Donald S.
    (Dean and Professor, School of Business, University at Albany, SUNY)

  • Keasey, Kevin
    (Professor of Accounting and Finance, the University of Leeds)

  • Filatotchev, Igor
    (Professor of Corporate Governance and Strategy, Cass Business School, City University London and Vienna University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

The behavior of managers-such as the rewards they obtain for poor performance, the role of boards of directors in monitoring managers, and the regulatory framework covering the corporate governance mechanisms that are put in place to ensure managers' accountability to shareholder and other stakeholders-has been the subject of extensive media and policy scrutiny in light of the financial crisis of the early 2000s. However, corporate governance covers a much broader set of issues, which requires detailed assessment as a central issue of concern to business and society. Critiques of traditional governance research based on agency theory have noted its "under-contextualized" nature and its inability to compare accurately and explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different institutional contexts. The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance aims at closing these theoretical and empirical gaps. It considers corporate governance issues at multiple levels of analysis-the individual manager, firms, institutions, industries, and nations-and presents international evidence to reflect the wide variety of perspectives. In analyzing the effects of corporate governance on performance, a variety of indicators are considered, such as accounting profit, economic profit, productivity growth, market share, proxies for environmental and social performance, such as diversity and other aspects of corporate social responsibility, and of course, share price effects. In addition to providing a high level review and analysis of the existing literature, each chapter develops an agenda for further research on a specific aspect of corporate governance. This Handbook constitutes the definitive source of academic research on corporate governance, synthesizing studies from economics, strategy, international business, organizational behavior, entrepreneurship, business ethics, accounting, finance, and law. Contributors to this volume - Ruth V. Aguilera, Department of Business Administration and a Fellow at the Center for Professional Responsibility of Business and Society at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Deborah Allcock, Bradford University School of Management Kevin Amess, Nottingham University Business School, University of Nottingham Jonathan D. Arthurs, Department of Management, Information Systems, and Entrepreneurship, Washington State University Fabio Bertoni, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Politecnico di Milano Christof Beuselinck, Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University David S. Boss, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University Stephen J. Brammer, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick Pamela Brandes, Whitman School of Management, Syracuse University Brian R. Cheffins, Faculty of Law, Cambridge University Xing Chen, Department of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong? Massimo G. Colombo, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Politecnico di Milano Brian L. Connelly, College of Business, Auburn University Annalisa Croce, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Politecnico di Milano Douglas Cumming , York University Schulich School of Business Na Dai, Suny, Albany Luiz Ricardo Kabbach De Castro, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Palash Deb, Management and marketing department, California State University San Marcos Marc E. Deloof, Antwerp Management School, University of Antwerp, Igor Filatotchev, Sir John Cass Business School, City University London. Veljko Fotak, Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma Jie Gao, University of International Business and Economics (Beijing) and University of Oklahoma Howard Gospel, Kings College London Michel Goyer, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick Jenny Harrow, Cass Business School, City University London Robert E. Hoskisson, Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University Edith S. Hotchkiss, Carroll School of Management, Boston College Sofia Johan, Schulich School of Business, York University Kevin Keasey, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds. Sophie Manigart, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, University of Ghent Marina Martynova, Management School, University of Sheffield Terry McNulty, Management School, University of Liverpool William L. Megginson, University of Oklahoma Andrea Mennicken, Department of Accounting, London School of Economics Miguel Meuleman, Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School, University of Ghent Stephen Pavelin, School of Management, University of Bath, Andrew Pendleton, York Management School, University of York Mike W. Peng, Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas Susan D. Phillips, School of Public Policy and Administration, Carlton University Michael Power, Centre for the Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics Annie Pye, Centre for Leadership Studies, University of Exeter Luc Renneboog, Department of Finance and Center, Tilburg University Mark J. Roe, Harvard Law School, Harvard University Steve Sauerwald, Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas Donald S. Siegel, School of Business, University of Albany. Philip Stiles, Centre for International Human Resource Management, University of Cambridge Laszlo Tihanyi, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University Karin S. Thorburn, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics Steve Toms, Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds Lorraine M. Uhlaner, Center for Entrepreneurship, Nyenrode Business Universiteit Robert Watson, IE Business School, Madrid Charlie Weir, Institute for Management Governance and Society, Robert Gordon University Robert E. White, College of Business, Iowa State University Geoffrey Wood, School of Management, University of Sheffield Mike Wright, Imperial College Business School, Imperial College Nai H. Wu - Mays Business School, Texas A&M University Chelsea Wyatt, Jones Graduate School of Business, Rice University Daphne W. Yiu, Department of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong Yuehua Xu, Department of Management, Chinese University of Hong Kong Yang Zhao, Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University

Suggested Citation

  • Wright, Mike & Siegel, Donald S. & Keasey, Kevin & Filatotchev, Igor (ed.), 2013. "The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Governance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199642007.
  • Handle: RePEc:oxp:obooks:9780199642007
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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