IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Financial Visibility and the Decision to Go Private

  • Hamid Mehran
  • Stavros Peristiani

A large fraction of the companies that went private between 1990 and 2007 were fairly young public firms, often with the same management team making the crucial restructuring decisions at both the time of the initial public offering (IPO) and the buyout. This article investigates the determinants of the decision to go private over a firm's entire public life cycle. Our evidence reveals that firms with declining growth in analyst coverage, falling institutional ownership, and low stock turnover were more likely to go private and opted to do so sooner. We argue that a primary reason behind the decision of IPO firms to abandon their public listing was a failure to attract a critical mass of financial visibility and investor interest. The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org., Oxford University Press.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhp044
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Society for Financial Studies in its journal The Review of Financial Studies.

Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 519-547

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:2:p:519-547
Contact details of provider: Postal: Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27513 USA.
Fax: 919-677-1714
Web page: http://www.rfs.oupjournals.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www4.oup.co.uk/revfin/subinfo/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
  2. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, 2001. "Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 121-144, Spring.
  3. Steven N. Kaplan, 1991. "The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts," NBER Working Papers 3653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Baker, H. Kent & Nofsinger, John R. & Weaver, Daniel G., 2002. "International Cross-Listing and Visibility," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 37(03), pages 495-521, September.
  5. Lehn, Kenneth & Poulsen, Annette, 1989. " Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(3), pages 771-87, July.
  6. Asquith, Paul & Wizman, Thierry A., 1990. "Event risk, covenants, and bondholder returns in leveraged buyouts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 195-213, September.
  7. Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C. Stein, 1993. "THE EVOLUTION OF BUYOUT PRICING AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (OR, WHAT WENT WRONG) IN THE 1980s," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 6(1), pages 72-88.
  8. Brennan, Michael J. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1995. "Investment analysis and price formation in securities markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 361-381, July.
  9. Renneboog, Luc & Simons, Tomas & Wright, Mike, 2007. "Why do public firms go private in the UK? The impact of private equity investors, incentive realignment and undervaluation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 591-628, September.
  10. Merton, Robert C., 1987. "A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information," Working papers 1869-87., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  11. Halpern, Paul & Kieschnick, Robert & Rotenberg, Wendy, 1999. "On the Heterogeneity of Leveraged Going Private Transactions," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(2), pages 281-309.
  12. Michael C. Jensen, 1991. "Corporate Control And The Politics Of Finance," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 4(2), pages 13-34.
  13. Steven N. Kaplan & Jeremy C. Stein, 1991. "The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure," NBER Working Papers 3695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2005. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership," NBER Working Papers 11505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Bhushan, Ravi, 1989. "Firm characteristics and analyst following," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2-3), pages 255-274, July.
  16. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
  17. Mikkelson, Wayne H. & Partch, M. Megan & Shah, Kshitij, 1997. "Ownership and operating performance of companies that go public," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 281-307, June.
  18. repec:dgr:kubtil:2005023 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  20. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Simons, T., 2005. "Public-to-Private Transactions : LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs," Discussion Paper 2005-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  21. Palepu, Krishna G., 1986. "Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-35, March.
  22. Krigman, Laurie & Shaw, Wayne H. & Womack, Kent L., 2001. "Why do firms switch underwriters?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2-3), pages 245-284, May.
  23. Asquith, Paul, 1948- & Wizman, Thierry A., 1990. "Event risk, covenants, and bondholder returns in leveraged buyouts," Working papers WP 3173-90., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  24. Chung, Kee H. & Jo, Hoje, 1996. "The Impact of Security Analysts' Monitoring and Marketing Functions on the Market Value of Firms," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(04), pages 493-512, December.
  25. repec:dgr:kubcen:200598 is not listed on IDEAS
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:23:y:2010:i:2:p:519-547. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.