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Private eradication of mobile public bads

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  • Costello, Christopher
  • Quérou, Nicolas
  • Tomini, Agnes

Abstract

We consider analytically the non-cooperative behavior of many private property owners who each controls the stock of a public bad, which can grow and spread across spatial areas. We characterize the conditions under which private property owners will control or eradicate, and determine how this decision depends on property-specific environmental features and on the behavior of other landowners. We show that high mobility or lower control by others result in lower private control. But when the marginal dynamic cost of the bad is sufficiently large, we find that global eradication may be privately optimal – in these cases, eradication arises in the non-cooperative game and is also socially optimal so there is, in effect, no externality.

Suggested Citation

  • Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2017. "Private eradication of mobile public bads," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 23-44.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:94:y:2017:i:c:p:23-44
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.02.005
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Courtois & Charles FiguiËres & ChloÈ Mulier & Joakim Weill, 2017. "A cost-benefit approach for prioritizing invasive species," Policy Papers 2017.06, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    2. repec:eee:ecolec:v:146:y:2018:i:c:p:607-620 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Courtois, Pierre & Figuieres, Charles & Mulier, Chloe & Weill, Joakim, 2018. "A Cost–Benefit Approach for Prioritizing Invasive Species," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C), pages 607-620.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public bad; Spatial externality; Invasive species; Spread; Eradication;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns

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