Citations of
Mehmet Bac

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Working papers

1. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Alfredo Burlando & Alberto Motta, 2007. "Self Reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0063, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Motta, Alberto & Burlando, Alfredo, 2007. "Self reporting reduces corruption in law enforcement," MPRA Paper 5332, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 19 Jan 2008. [Downloadable!]

2. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0178, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Potters, J.J.M. & Shefton, M. & Vesterlund, L., 2003. "After you - endougenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Discussion Paper 98, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Potters, Jan & Sefton, Martin & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "After you--endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(8), pages 1399-1419, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2001. "Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 722-748, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Bac, Mehmet, 2000. "On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(4), pages 681-701, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Mehmet Bac & Serife Genc, 2009. "The French first employment contract: efficient screening device or Kleenex contract?," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 77-88, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   2. Pinoli, Sara, 2008. "Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract," MPRA Paper 11429, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

3. Mehmet Bac, 2000. "Switching costs and screening efficiency of incomplete contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(4), pages 1034-1048, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Xiaopeng Xu, 2002. "Quality over-provision of information goods," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12, pages 1-9. [Downloadable!]

4. Mehmet Bac, 1997. "Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 153(2), pages 320-, June.

   Cited by:

   1. Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

5. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 301-315, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Nedim M. Alemdar & Süheyla Özyildirim, . "A Genetic Game of Trade, Growth, and Externalities," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 148, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
   2. Toman, Michael & Shogren, Jason, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-22, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
   3. Pierre-Yves Hénin & Katheline Schubert, 2008. "How long can excess pollution persist? The non-cooperative case," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00267762_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Hénin, Pierre-Yves & Schubert, Katheline, 2008. "How long can excess pollution persist? The non-cooperative case," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 277-293, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   4. Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2009. "Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties," Working Papers 2009-08, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University. [Downloadable!]

6. Bac, Mehmet & Raff, Horst, 1996. "Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 125-134, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2006. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2006_08, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2005. "Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3642, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
      • Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2005. "Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness," Working Papers 2005.66, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   2. Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 1997. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Working Papers 97003, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised May 1997. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J., 2002. "The game of negotiations: ordering issues and implementing agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 169-191, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius J. Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200010, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      • Lutz-Alexander Busch & Ignatius Horstmann, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1109, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
      • Ignatius J. Horstmann & Kimberley A. Scharf, 2000. "The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 200011, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   3. Manfred Königstein & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations," IZA Discussion Papers 1762, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Manfred Königstein & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations," Post-Print halshs-00175021_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
      • Marie-Claire Villeval & Manfred Konigstein, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations," Working Papers 0508, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
      • Manfred Königstein & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: efficiency and behavioral considerations," Post-Print halshs-00180038_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
   4. Francis Bloch & Geoffroy De Clippel, 2008. "Cores of combined games," Working Papers hal-00356298_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Francis Bloch & Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Cores of Combined Games," Working Papers 2009-1, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   5. Alessandra Sgobbi & Carlo Carraro, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007.81, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Carraro, Carlo & Sgobbi, Alessandra, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: A Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," CEPR Discussion Papers 6424, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      • Carlo Carraro & Alessandra Sgobbi, 2007. "Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2007_12, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   6. Eric Rasmusen & ., 1995. "A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 9506001, EconWPA, revised 14 Jun 1995. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Rasmusen, E., 1994. "A Model of Negotiation, not Bargainig," Papers 94-007, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.

7. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 277-98, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Post-Print halshs-00180044_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "Corruption as Betrayal : Experimental Evidence on Corruption Under Delegation," Working Papers 0506, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
   2. Mehmet Bac & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2005. "Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency," Game Theory and Information 0508001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Mehmet Bac & Serkan Kucuksenel, 2006. "Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 262-276, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   3. Ira N. Gang & Amal Sanyal & Omkar Goswami, 1998. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Departmental Working Papers 199604, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000. " Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 61-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   4. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]

8. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Hainz, Christa & Boerner, Kira, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corruption and and the Role of Financial Institutions," Proceedings of the German Development Economics Conference, Kiel 2005 6, Verein für Socialpolitik, Research Committee Development Economics. [Downloadable!]
   2. Kira Boerner & Christa Hainz, 2006. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," Discussion Papers 135, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Kira Boerner & Christa Hainz, 2004. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
      • Börner, Kira & Hainz, Christa, 2004. "The Political Economy of Corruption and the Role of Financial Institutions," Discussion Papers in Economics 411, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   3. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   4. André Carraro & Adelar Fochezatto & Ronald Otto Hillbrecht, 2006. "O Impacto Da Corrupção Sobre O Crescimento Econômico Do Brasil: Aplicação De Um Modelo De Equilíbrio Geral Para O Período 1994-1998," Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 57, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
   5. Ira N. Gang & Amal Sanyal & Omkar Goswami, 1998. "Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Departmental Working Papers 199604, Rutgers University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Sanyal, Amal & Gang, Ira N & Goswami, Omkar, 2000. " Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 61-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   6. Kira Boerner & Christa Hainz, 2007. "The Political Economy of Corruption & the Role of Financial Institutions," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp892, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
   7. André Carraro & Ronald O. Hillbrecht, 2003. "Modelos Microeconômicos de Corrupção Burocrática e Seus Determinantes Econômicos," Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] d36, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
   8. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   9. Mehmet Bac, 2001. "Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 87-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
      Other versions:
      • Bac, Mehmet, 2001. " Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 87-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

9. Bac, Mehmet, 1993. "Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 663-83, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Mehmet Bac, 2009. "An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 233-256, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.