Darke Side of Social Capital Social Preferences and Corruption
AbstractUsing the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the supervisor. This result suggests that corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and potential bribery, may be reduced by the means of staff rotation. Evidence from an experimental study supports this proposition
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 17179.
Date of creation: 08 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Principal Agent Supervisor paradigm; Social Capital ; Social Preferences; Bureaucracy; Corruption ; Staff Rotation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-09-19 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-POL-2009-09-19 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-09-19 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
1995-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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- Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
- Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-24, Fall.
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