An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-008-9091-5
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Cited by:
- Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
- Laura Boudreau & Sylvain Chassang & Ada González-Torre & Rachel Heath, 2023. "Monitoring Harassment in Organizations," Working Papers 311, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
- Laura Boudreau & Sylvain Chassang & Ada González-Torre & Rachel Heath, 2023. "Monitoring Harassment in Organizations," Working Papers 2022-19, Princeton University. Economics Department..
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More about this item
Keywords
Incentives; Whistleblowing; Information; Organization; D23; D82; L22;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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