Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations
AbstractWe examine optimal individual and entity-level liability for negligence when expected accident costs depend on both the agent's level of expertise and the principal's level of authority. We consider these issues in the context of physician and managed care organization (MCO) liability for medical malpractice. Under current law, physicians generally are considered independent contractors and hence MCOs are not liable for negligent acts by physicians. We find that the practice of reviewing the medical decisions of physicians affects their incentives to take care, which in turn implies that it is efficient for MCOs to be held liable for the torts committed by their physicians.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
Other versions of this item:
- Jennifer Arlen & W.Bentley Macleod, 2004. "Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations," Working Papers 04-26, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008.
"First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 123(2), pages 795-830, 05.
- Daniel Carvell & Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2012.
"Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
RAND Corporation, vol. 43(1), pages 51-77, 03.
- Daniel Carvell & Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2009. "Accidental Death and the Rule of Joint and Several Liability," NBER Working Papers 15412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark Votruba, 2008.
"Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System,"
NBER Working Papers
14212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark E. Votruba, 2008. "Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 93-113, Fall.
- Wright, Donald J., 2011.
"Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule,"
2011-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Donald J., Wright, 2011. "Medical malpractice and physician liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 205-211, September.
- Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability," NBER Working Papers 15383, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lakdawalla, Darius N. & Seabury, Seth A., 2012. "The welfare effects of medical malpractice liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 356-369.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.