Why Do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?
AbstractPolicemen are known to support colleagues who are the subject of criminal investigations. Although we might expect guilty officers to defend each other, why do (otherwise) law-abiding policemen defend those who have broken the law? We investigate under what conditions it is in the interest of a group to defend its "bad" members. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 45 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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