1. Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2004. "Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(4), pages 915-931, August.
2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
3. Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," NBER Working Papers 5466, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. James Malcomson, 2003. "Health Service Gatekeepers," Economics Series Working Papers 169, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • James Malcomson, 2003. "Health Service Gatekeepers," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • James M. Malcomson, 2004. "Health Service Gatekeepers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 401-421, Summer.
5. Anna Aizer & Janet Currie & Enrico Moretti, 2004. "Competition in Imperfect Markets: Does it Help California's Medicaid Mothers?," NBER Working Papers 10429, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Martin Gaynor & James Rebitzer & Lowell Taylor, . "Incentives in HMOs," GSIA Working Papers 2003-E21, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2001. "Incentives in HMOs," NBER Working Papers 8522, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Martin Gaynor & James B Rebitzer & Lowell J Taylor, 2002. "Incentives in HMO's," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/089, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2001. "Incentives In HMOs," Macroeconomics 0111001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin Gaynor & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2001. "Incentives In HMOs," Economics Working Paper Archive 340, Levy Economics Institute, The. [Downloadable!]
7. Glied, Sherry & Zivin, Joshua Graff, 2002. "How do doctors behave when some (but not all) of their patients are in managed care?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 337-353, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Kessler, Daniel & McClellan, Mark, 1996. "Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(2), pages 353-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Craswell, Richard & Calfee, John E, 1986. "Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 279-303, Fall.
11. Marilyn J. Simon, 1982. "Diagnoses and Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 170-180, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Kessler, Daniel P. & McClellan, Mark B., 2002. "How liability law affects medical productivity," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 931-955, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Cyrus Chu, C. Y. & Qian, Yingyi, 1995. "Vicarious liability under a negligence rule," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 305-322, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Mark Duggan, 2002. "Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of Government Programs? Evidence from Medicaid HMOs," NBER Working Papers 9091, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Duggan, Mark, 2004. "Does contracting out increase the efficiency of government programs? Evidence from Medicaid HMOs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2549-2572, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark Votruba, 2008. "Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System," NBER Working Papers 14212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark E. Votruba, 2008. "Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 93-113, Fall.
2. Darius N. Lakdawalla & Seth A. Seabury, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Medical Malpractice Liability," NBER Working Papers 15383, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 12478, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2008. "First Do No Harm? Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(2), pages 795-830, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)