Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Volume (Year): 30 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870
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