Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems
AbstractWhen abatement costs are uncertain, but correlated, and a country becomes pri-vately informed that costs are low, then unilateral actions serve as a signalling devise to reveal low costs and unilateral actions have the potential to trigger positive responses abroad. However, the country engaging in unilateral actions is the one with the highest expectation about the other countriesâ reactions, and it might suffer from an effect like the winners curse.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Resource and Energy Economics.
Volume (Year): 26 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505569
Other versions of this item:
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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