Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy
AbstractWe analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" with number SP II 2011-109.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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Mitigation; international climate agreements; bargaining; unilateral advances;
Other versions of this item:
- Kai A. Konrad & Marcel Thum, 2011. "Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy," Working Papers unilateral_action_and_neg, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-01-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENE-2012-01-25 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-01-25 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
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"Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 373-391, December.
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003. "Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems," Working Papers 40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April.
- Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2011.
"Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1339-1348.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2010. "Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements," IDEI Working Papers 628, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Katarina Elofsson, 2007. "Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(2), pages 143-162, February.
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