Unilateral Action and Negotiations about Climate Policy
AbstractWe analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance in its series Working Papers with number unilateral_action_and_negotiations_about_climate_policy.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
mitigation; international climate agreements; bargaining; unilateral advances;
Other versions of this item:
- Konrad, Kai A. & Thum, Marcel, 2011. "Unilateral action and negotiations about climate policy," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-03-21 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENE-2012-03-21 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-03-21 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
- Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2011.
"Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1339-1348.
- Beccherle, Julien & Tirole, Jean, 2010. "Regional Initiatives and the Cost of Delaying Binding Climate Change Agreements," IDEI Working Papers 628, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Katarina Elofsson, 2007. "Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 36(2), pages 143-162, February.
- Bård Harstad, 2007. "Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 871-889, June.
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2003.
"Unilateral Actions the Case of International Environmental Problems,"
40/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Brandt, Urs Steiner, 2004. "Unilateral actions, the case of international environmental problems," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 373-391, December.
- Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hans Mueller).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.