Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties
AbstractThis paper examines countries’ free-riding incentives in international environmental agreements (IEAs) when, first, the treaty is non-enforceable, and second, countries do not have complete information about other countries’ noncompliance cost. We analyze a signaling model whereby the country leading the negotiations of the international agreement can reveal its own noncompliance costs through the commitment level it signs in the IEA. Our results show that countries’ probability to join the IEA is increasing in the free-riding benefits they can obtain from other countries’ compliance, and decreasing in their own noncompliance costs. This paper shows that, when free-riding incentives are strong enough, there is no equilibrium in which all types of countries join the IEA. Despite not joining the IEA, countries invest in clean technologies. Finally, we relate our results with some common observations in international negotiations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University in its series Working Papers with number 2009-08.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
Signaling games; environmental agreements; nonbinding negotiations; noncompliance cost;
Other versions of this item:
- Ana Espínola-Arredondo & Félix Muñoz-García, 2011. "Free-riding in international environmental agreements: A signaling approach to non-enforceable treaties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(1), pages 111-134, January.
- Ana Espinola-Arredondo & Felix Munoz-Garcia, 2009. "Free-riding in International Environmental Agreements: A Signaling Approach to Non-Enforceable Treaties," Working Papers 2009-08, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-01-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-01-16 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-ENV-2010-01-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-01-16 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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