Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity
AbstractThis paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner?s dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached. --
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.
Volume (Year): 87 (2003)
Issue (Month): 9-10 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578
Other versions of this item:
- Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten, 2001. "Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-14, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- Q00 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - General
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