Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?
AbstractA higher level of transparency in decision making increases the probability that corruption or wrongdoing is detected. It may also improve outsiders' information about the identities of key decision makers, thereby enhance incentives to establish "connections" for corruption. The connections effect may dominate the detection effect for local improvement in transparency and generate an increase in corruption, a prediction sharply in contrast with standard theories of transparency. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 107 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Other versions of this item:
- Mehmet Bac, 2001. "Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 87-96, April.
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- Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
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- Peerayuth Charoensukmongkol & Murad Moqbel, 2014. "Does Investment in ICT Curb or Create More Corruption? A Cross-Country Analysis," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 51-63, March.
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- Francesco Giuli & Marco Manzo, 2005. "Protecting Savings: Do We Need a Supervision Authority?," Working Papers 84, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
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