Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency
We introduce ex-ante collusion whereby the supervisor stops monitoring for a transfer payment from the agent, in addition to ex-post collusion following the monitoring outcome. Extending a well-known model of hierarchy, we study the determinants of ex-ante collusion and show that, depending on the parameter values we identify, the principal can ignore either ex-post or ex-ante collusion.
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- Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993.
"Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,"
Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-01, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
- Kofman, F. & Lawarree, J., 1990. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Working Papers 91-01, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 277-98, October.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-24, Fall.
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