The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption
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Cited by:
- Mehmet Bac, 2001.
"Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 87-96, April.
- Bac, Mehmet, 2001. "Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1-2), pages 87-96, April.
- Ararat L. Osipian, 2013. "Corrupt organizations: modeling educators’ misconduct with cellular automata," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, March.
- Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
- Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrew Samuel & Aaron Lowen, 2010. "Bribery and inspection technology," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 333-350, November.
- Wolfgang Maennig, 2004. "Korruption im internationalen Sport: ökonomische Analyse und Lösungsansätze," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(2), pages 263-291.
- Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
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