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Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration

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  • Sanyal, Amal

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  • Sanyal, Amal, 2000. "Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 364-378, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:28:y:2000:i:2:p:364-378
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
    2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1990. "Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three-Level Hierarchy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(2), pages 301-324, Fall.
    3. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    4. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    5. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 322-344, December.
    6. Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Tax evasion: A model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 339-346.
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    Cited by:

    1. Michal Karas, 2012. "Tax rate to maximize the revenue: Laffer curve for the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 189-194.
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:155-168 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Laszlo Goerke, 2008. "Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
    4. Yuanlin Feng & Fei Wang & Lingyun He, 2025. "Collusion and corporate tax burden: Firm‐level evidence from China," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(4), pages 1956-1972, June.
    5. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Wilson, John K. & Damania, Richard, 2005. "Corruption, political competition and environmental policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 516-535, May.

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