IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/ecogov/v11y2010i4p333-350.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bribery and inspection technology

Author

Listed:
  • Andrew Samuel
  • Aaron Lowen

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Samuel & Aaron Lowen, 2010. "Bribery and inspection technology," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 333-350, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:333-350
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-010-0080-0
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-010-0080-0
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10101-010-0080-0?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
    2. Bac, Mehmet, 1998. "The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 101-120, March.
    3. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
    4. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 322-344, December.
    5. Alberto Motta, 2009. "Ex-ante and Ex-post Corruption," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0094, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Pozsgai-Alvarez & Iván Pastor Sanz, 2021. "Mapping the (anti-)corruption field: key topics and changing trends, 1968–2020," Journal of Computational Social Science, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 851-881, November.
    2. Sidney C. Turner, 2014. "Public Sector Agglomeration in Developed Countries: The Role of Oversight," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 191-210, June.
    3. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ajit Mishra & Andrew Samuel, 2013. "Preemptive Bribery with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics Working Papers 13/13, University of Bath, Department of Economics.
    2. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Kahana, Nava & Qijun, Liu, 2010. "Endemic corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 82-88, March.
    4. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2000. "Law Enforcement Costs and Legal Presumptions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0194, Econometric Society.
    5. Mishra, Ajit, 2002. "Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-178, February.
    6. Samuel, Andrew, 2009. "Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 441-450, August.
    7. Mehmet Bac, 2001. "Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 87-96, April.
    8. Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    9. Mehmet Bac, 2007. "Optimal supervision intensity, collusion, and the organization of work," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 40(1), pages 317-339, February.
    10. Sanyal, Amal, 2000. "Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 364-378, June.
    11. Adam Salisbury, 2018. "Cutting the Head off the Snake: An Empirical Investigation of Hierarchical Corruption in Burkina Faso," CSAE Working Paper Series 2018-11, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    12. Mishra, Ajit, 2006. "Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 349-358, February.
    13. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    14. Lambsdorff, Johann Graf & Grubiak, Kevin & Werner, Katharina, 2023. "Intrinsic Motivation vs. Corruption? Experimental Evidence on the Performance of Officials," MPRA Paper 118153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Miceli, Thomas J., 2007. "Criminal solicitation, entrapment, and the enforcement of law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 258-268.
    16. Meerza, Syed Imran Ali & Giannakas, Konstantinos & Yiannaka, Amalia, 2021. "Optimal Policy Response to Food Fraud," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 46(3), September.
    17. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2018. "Private enforcement, corruption, and antitrust design," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 284-307.
    18. Polterovich, Victor, 2001. "Rent Seeking, Tax Policy, and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 20058, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Gomez, Fernando & Ganuza, Juan-Jose, 2002. "Civil and criminal sanctions against blackmail: an economic analysis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 475-498, May.
    20. Almeida, Rita & Carneiro, Pedro, 2009. "Enforcement of labor regulation and firm size," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 28-46, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Bribery; Inspection technology; e-Government; K42; D73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:11:y:2010:i:4:p:333-350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.