Civil and criminal sanctions against blackmail: an economic analysis
No abstract is available for this item.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997.
"Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
1460, David K. Levine.
- Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1995.
"Threats Without Binding Commitment,"
1139, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999.
"Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement,"
NBER Working Papers
6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Reputation and imperfect information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2002:i:4:p:475-498. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.