Criminal choice, nonmonetary sanctions and marginal deterrence: A normative analysis
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- Detotto, Claudio & McCannon, Bryan C. & Vannini, Marco, 2015. "Evidence of marginal deterrence: Kidnapping and murder in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 63-67.
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- Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2011. "Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-166/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- BRYAN C. McCANNON, 2009. "Differentiating Between First And Repeat Offenses," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(1), pages 76-85, 01.
- Ognedal, Tone, 2005. "Should the Standard of Proof be Lowered to Reduce Crime?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 45-61, March.
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