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Corruption, efficiency wage and union leadership

Author

Listed:
  • Chaudhuri, Sarbajit
  • Ghosh Dastidar, Krishnendu

Abstract

This paper develops a model of determination of unionized wage in the presence of both collective bargaining and efficiency wage. The efficiency of each worker is positively related to both the wage and the unemployment rate in the economy. The unionized wage is greater than the efficiency wage. The firm finds it profitable to keep the unionized wage as close as possible to the efficiency wage. The union leader who is entrusted with the task of determining the unionized wage charges a bribe from the firm to keep the wage close to this level. The corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm play a two-stage Nash bargaining game from where equilibrium unionized wage and the bribe are determined. The analysis leads to some interesting results which are important for anticorruption policy formulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Ghosh Dastidar, Krishnendu, 2014. "Corruption, efficiency wage and union leadership," MPRA Paper 57050, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:57050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Banerjee, Dibyendu, 2010. "FDI in agricultural land, welfare and unemployment in a developing economy," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(4), pages 229-239, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sarbajit Chaudhuri, 2016. "Trade Unionism and Welfare Consequences of Trade and Investment Reforms in A Developing Economy," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 152-171, February.
    2. Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, 2014. "How can trade unionism affect welfare consequences of trade and investment reforms in a developing economy?," MPRA Paper 59063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2014. "Participation of Ordinary Investors and Stock Market Quality: A Comparison between Japanese and US Markets," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(5), pages 537-558, December.
    4. Sarbajit Chaudhuri & Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar & Sushobhan Mahata, 2022. "Cronyism and corruption in India: A game theoretic analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(6), pages 2607-2618, September.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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