La mise en vigueur des politiques environnementales et l’organisation de la firme
This article examines the relationship between the enforcement strategy chosen by an Environmental Protection Agency and the organization of a firm. Under plausible assumptions it is shown that if the Agency ignores the firm's incentive system, then the firm cannot be decentralized. Cet article étudie la relation entre l’organisation d’une firme et la manière dont les politiques environnementales sont administrées par une Agence de protection de l’environnement. Sous des hypothèses plausibles, il est démontré que si l’Agence néglige les incitations monétaires utilisées par la firme, alors celle-ci ne peut opérer de façon décentralisée.
Volume (Year): 70 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (juin)
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