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note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

Author

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  • Mehmet Bac

    (Bilkent University, Department of Economics, Bilkent, Ankara, 06533 Turkey)

Abstract

Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehmet Bac, 2000. "note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(1), pages 119-126.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:119-126
    Note: Received: July 1996/Final version: August 1999
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Bac, 2001. "On Creating and Claiming Value in Negotiations," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 237-251, May.

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