IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/7592.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata

Author

Listed:
  • Osipian, Ararat

Abstract

Misconduct in education is a serious problem internationally. As the education sector grows, so does the scale of misconduct. The large bureaucratic apparatus, overregulation, outdated and unclear rules, and poor audit create opportunities for abuse. The blending of public sector, private firms, and personal interests of educators and education bureaucrats leads to collusion and evolvement of different forms of misconduct, especially widespread in large university systems and school districts. Corruption and other forms of misconduct may be modeled in large educational organizations with strong vertical and horizontal ties with the help of cellular automata. This paper offers a theoretical framework and a methodology based on cellular automata to study corruption in large educational organizations, including school districts and state university systems. The presented methodology is based on cellular automata. In the essence of cellular automata are different programming characteristics designed to predict future misconduct. Starting with different cases or combinations of behavior on the workplace and working environment as initial conditions, the process of cellular automation simulates behavior of educators and results in images that depict likely future developments in educators’ misconduct within educational and bureaucratic organizations. Applicability of the offered methodology and its value is in modeling, simulation, and control.

Suggested Citation

  • Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7592
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7592/1/MPRA_paper_7592.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jay Pil Choi & Marcel Thum, 2004. "The Economics of Repeated Extortion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 203-223, Summer.
    2. Bac, Mehmet, 1998. "The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 101-120, March.
    3. Jakob Svensson, 2005. "Eight Questions about Corruption," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 19-42, Summer.
    4. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    5. Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, 2006. "How Corruption Affects Service Delivery and What Can Be Done About It," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 875-912, July.
    7. Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane, 1995. "Indirect Monitoring and Optimal Corruption," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 52, Stockholm School of Economics.
    8. Olsen, Trond E & Torsvik, Gaute, 1998. "Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 413-438, May.
    9. Mr. Paolo Mauro, 1996. "The Effects of Corruptionon Growth, Investment, and Government Expenditure," IMF Working Papers 1996/098, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Christian R. Ahlin, 2001. "Corruption: Political Determinants and Macroeconomic Effects," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0126, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    11. Guriev, Sergei, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
    12. Roland Strausz, 1997. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal–Supervisor–Agent Relationship," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 497-518, December.
    13. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    14. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
    15. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-656, May.
    16. Franz Wirl, 1998. "Socio-economic typologies of bureaucratic corruption and implications," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 199-220.
    17. Jia Shao & Plamen Ch. Ivanov & Boris Podobnik & H. Eugene Stanley, 2007. "Quantitative relations between corruption and economic factors," Papers 0705.0161, arXiv.org.
    18. Isaac Ehrlich & Francis T. Lui, 1999. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Endogenous Economic Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages 270-293, December.
    19. Francis T. Lui, 1996. "Three Aspects Of Corruption," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 26-29, July.
    20. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-414, May.
    21. Reinikka, Ritva & Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Survey techniques to measure and explain corruption," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3071, The World Bank.
    22. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    23. Lui, Francis T., 1986. "A dynamic model of corruption deterrence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 215-236, November.
    24. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    25. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    26. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    27. Jia Shao & Plamen Ch. Ivanov & Boris Podobnik & H. Eugene Stanley, 2007. "Quantitative relations between corruption and economic factors," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 56(2), pages 157-166, March.
    28. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 1995. "Collusive Auditors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 442-446, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ararat L. Osipian, 2013. "Corrupt organizations: modeling educators’ misconduct with cellular automata," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 1-24, March.
    2. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2010. "Bribery versus extortion: allowing the lesser of two evils," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(1), pages 179-198, March.
    3. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    4. Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2016. "Fiscal policy and corruption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 57-79, January.
    5. Maurizio Lisciandra & Emanuele Millemaci, 2017. "The economic effect of corruption in Italy: a regional panel analysis," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(9), pages 1387-1398, September.
    6. Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
      • Hanna, Rema N. & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2012. "Corruption," Scholarly Articles 8830779, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
      • Banerjee, Abhijit & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2012. "Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp12-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
      • Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2012. "Corruption," Working Papers id:4952, eSocialSciences.
      • Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 17968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Bertrand Venard, 2013. "Institutions, Corruption and Sustainable Development," Post-Print hal-00874275, HAL.
    8. Alice N. Sindzingre & Christian Milelli, 2010. "The Uncertain Relationship between Corruption and Growth in Developing Countries: Threshold Effects and State Effectiveness," EconomiX Working Papers 2010-10, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    9. Cooter, Robert & Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt83c0k3wc, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
    10. Susan-Rose Ackerman, 1997. "Corruption, Infefficiency and Economic Growth," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 24, pages 3-20.
    11. Lambsdorff, Johann, 2001. "How corruption in government affects public welfare: A review of theory," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 9, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    12. Bertrand Venard, 2013. "Institutions, Corruption and Sustainable Development," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(4), pages 2545-2562.
    13. Farida, Moe & Ahmadi-Esfahani, Fredoun Z., 2008. "Corruption and economic growth in Lebanon," 2008 Conference (52nd), February 5-8, 2008, Canberra, Australia 6043, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    14. Bac, Mehmet & Bag, Parimal Kanti, 2006. "Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 478-499, December.
    15. Nicolas Jacquemet, 2005. "La corruption comme une imbrication de contrats : Une revue de la littérature microéconomique," Working Papers 2005-29, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    16. Turhan Kaymak & Eralp Bektas, 2015. "Corruption in Emerging Markets: A Multidimensional Study," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 785-805, December.
    17. Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009. "Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
    18. Hindriks, Jean & Keen, Michael & Muthoo, Abhinay, 1999. "Corruption, extortion and evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 395-430, December.
    19. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017. "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
    20. Arjona Trujillo, Ana María, 2002. "La corrupción política: una revisión de la literatura," DE - Documentos de Trabajo. Economía. DE de021404, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    cellular automata; corruption; education; methodology; misconduct; modeling;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7592. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.