Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption
AbstractCorruption opportunities arise when a principal delegates enforcement or audit authority to a supervisor. The supervisor may then strike a deal with the agent she is supposed to monitor and conceal important information from the principal. Corruption imposes a constraint on governance and appears therefore to be harmful for the principal. The authors show that this need not be the case. In their model, the prospect of corruption can make the principal better off. The reason is that the collusion possibility generates dynamic effects which, in cases where only limited intertemporal commitments can be made, may be beneficial for the principal. Copyright 1998 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 39 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Other versions of this item:
- Olsen, T.E. & Torsvik, G., 1998. "Collusion and Renegotiation in Hierarchies: A Case of Beneficial Corruption," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 179, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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