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On the optimality of allowing collusion

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Author Info
Kofman, Fred
Lawarree, Jacques
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 61 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 383-407
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:61:y:1996:i:3:p:383-407

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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  1. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," IEPR Working Papers 05.9, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
  2. Nobuo Yoshida, 2000. "The Optimal Combination of Corruption Reforms: Is a Comprehensive Approach a Good Idea?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1335, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," CEPR Discussion Papers 4907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005. "A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000068, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Juan D. Carrillo, 2000. "Corruption in Hierarchies," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 59, pages 03, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ugo Albertazzi, 2006. "Incentives in universal banks," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 572, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  8. Ingela Alger & Régis Renault, 2007. "Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 291-311, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, 2005. "Beneficial Collusion in Corruption Control: The Case of Nonmonetary Penalties," Department of Economics Discussion Papers 0205, Department of Economics, University of Surrey. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  11. Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1057, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Osipian, Ararat, 2008. "The World is Flat: Modeling Educators’ Misconduct with Cellular Automata," MPRA Paper 7592, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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