Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info

Paper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2005-09-P.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 15/2, 457-478, 2006
Handle: RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2005-09-p

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Box 353330, Seattle, WA 98193-3330
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.washington.edu/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Michael Goldblatt).

Related research

Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Gorkem Celik & Serdar Sayan, 2008. "On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 209-227, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Shirley J. , HO, 2007. "R&D Outsourcing Contract with Information Leakage," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2007026, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
3. Gorkem Celik, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1363-1363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Yolande Hiriart & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2009. "The public management of risk: Separating ex ante and ex post monitors," PSE Working Papers 2009-20, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
5. Scholz, Julia, 2008. "Auswirkungen vertikaler Kollusionsprobleme auf die vertragliche Ausgestaltung von Kreditverkäufen," Discussion Papers in Business Administration 4581, University of Munich, Munich School of Management. [Downloadable!]

Did you know? Data contributors to RePEc receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-23.