Incentives for corruptible auditors in the absence of commitment
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Washington, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number UWEC-2005-09-P.
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, Volume 15/2, 457-478, 2006
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