A Principal-Agent Theory Approach to Public Expenditure Management Systems in Developing Countries
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Cited by:
- Luc Leruth, 2012. "Public-Private Cooperation in Infrastructure Development: A Principal-Agent Story of Contingent Liabilities, Fiscal Risks, and Other (Un)pleasant Surprises," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 223-237, June.
- Justice Nyigmah Bawole & Peter Adjei-Bamfo, 2020. "Public Procurement and Public Financial Management in Africa: Dynamics and Influences," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 301-318, June.
- Paulo Reis Mourao & Alina Irina Popescu, 2021. "Discussing the political survival of Romanian ministers since 1989—Do economic conditions matter?," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 63-93, January.
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Keywords
WP; agency cost; optimal contract;All these keywords.
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