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Discussing the political survival of Romanian ministers since 1989—Do economic conditions matter?

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  • Paulo Reis Mourao
  • Alina Irina Popescu

Abstract

Political longevity in young democracies has attracted the attention of scholars and practitioners alike due to several particular characteristics of such democracies, such as a low level of trust, a low level of credibility, corruption, economic difficulties, a less well‐established rule of law and an increased bureaucracy. In such a context, we studied the tenure duration of Romanian ministers since 1989, as well as their accumulated political longevity in ministerial offices. Using proportional hazards regression, we observed some peculiarities in the young Romanian democracy in comparison with more established regimes. We observed that left‐wing majorities tend to increase the probability of seat changes and thus diminish tenure longevity. We also observed that good economic conditions may lead to the substitution of certain types of ministries, while higher inflation rates tend to shorten tenure longevity for Romanian ministers. Moreover, our estimations support the finding that Romanian ministers tend to have shorter tenures as the number of past ministerial functions increases and that the burden of simultaneously managing various ministries significantly contributes to the shorter political longevity of a given minister. Finally, recent ministers have had longer tenures than those in the first years after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989.

Suggested Citation

  • Paulo Reis Mourao & Alina Irina Popescu, 2021. "Discussing the political survival of Romanian ministers since 1989—Do economic conditions matter?," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 63-93, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:ectrin:v:29:y:2021:i:1:p:63-93
    DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12268
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