Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 34 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2-3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Mathias Dewatripont & Eric Maskin, 1990. "Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9579, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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- Robert Evans & Sonje Reiche, 2013. "Mechanism Design and Non-Cooperative Renegotiation," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1331, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Thakor, Anjan V., 1996. "The design of financial systems: An overview," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 917-948, June.
- Frank Gigler & Thomas Hemmer, 2008. "On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 243-265, November.
- Graziano, Clara, 1995. "Cost observability and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 359-372, December.
- Salvatore Piccolo & David Martimort, 2006. "The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracting in a Competing Hierarchies Environment," CSEF Working Papers 160, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 08 Dec 2006.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
- Fohlin, Caroline, 1999. "Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 305-343, October.
- Martimort, David & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2010.
"The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts,"
Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole
http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
- Krasa, Stefan, 1999. "Unimprovable Allocations in Economies with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 144-168, July.
- Dan Anderberg & Carlo Perroni, .
"Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule,"
EPRU Working Paper Series
00-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Anderberg, D. & Perroni, C., 2000. "Renegotiation of Social Contracts by Majority Rule," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 566, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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