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Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion

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Author Info
Yeon-Koo Che

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Abstract

In this article, I study how the presence of a revolving door and potential collusion between a regulator and a regulated firm affect the regulator's performance incentives. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, these seemingly undesirable features of the regulatory system may serve the interests of the government because (i) the regulator's efforts to enhance her industry qualifications may have a complementary effect on her regulatory performance and (ii) the regulator may become more aggressive in regulation so as to signal her industry qualifications to the firm. Collusion between a regulator and a firm also can be beneficial because a regulator may increase her monitoring effort in order to increase the chance of achieving a profitable side contract with the firm, and side-contracting may not always succeed.

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File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199523%2926%3A3%3C378%3ARDATOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M&origin=repec
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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 26 (1995)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 378-397
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:26:y:1995:i:autumn:p:378-397

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  2. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée & Sungho Yun, 2007. "Bribery vs. Extortion: Allowing the Lesser of two Evils," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Eric Helland & Michael Sykuta, 2002. "Regulation and the Evolution of Corporate Boards: Monitoring, Advising or Window Dressing?," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-27, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  4. Gary Biglaiser & Ching-to Albert Ma, 2006. "Moonlighting: Public Service and Private Practice," Working Papers 12, Portuguese Competition Authority. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Mark Armstrong & David Sappington, 2005. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Industrial Organization 0505011, EconWPA, revised 07 Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
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