Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion
AbstractThis paper studies the efficiency of collusion between supervisors and supervisees. Building on Tirole (1986)'s results that deterring collusion with infinitely risk averse supervisors is impossible, while it is costless to do so under risk neutrality, we develop here a theory of collusion based on a trade-off between the risk premia required by (less extreme) risk attitudes and incentives. This allows us to link the efficiency of collusion to the supervisor's risk aversion and to various parameters characterizing the economic environment in which collusion may take place. We are then able to derive implications for the design of organizations, like determining how the number of tasks/agents per supervisor or the level of competition may impact on the cost of collusion, studying the impact of vertical integration on those same costs, or characterizing the role of uncertainty on side-contracting.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- Antoine Faure-Grimaud & Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2002. "Risk averse supervisors and the efficiency of collusion," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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