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An anti corruption mechansim

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  • Jellal, Mohamed

Abstract

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necesarily know the supervisor’s preferences.We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the supervisor. This result suggests thaht corruption, which is likely to emerge in long term reciprocal relationships between public officials and potential bribery, may be reduced by the means of staff rotation. Evidence from an experimental study supports this proposition.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38647.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38647

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Keywords: Principal-agent-supervisor; corruption; bureaucracy ; rotation;

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  1. Strausz, R., 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January.
  3. Qizilbash, M., 1994. "Corruption, temptation and guilt: moral character in economic theory," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9419, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Andvig, J.C. & Ove Moene, K., 1988. "How Corruption May Corrupt," Memorandum 20/1988, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  5. Metin M. Cosgel & Thomas J. Miceli, 1999. "Job Rotation: Cost, Benefits, and Stylized Facts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(2), pages 301-, June.
  6. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  7. Abbink, Klaus, 1999. "Staff Rotation: A Powerful Weapon Against Corruption?," Discussion Paper Serie B 460, University of Bonn, Germany.
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