Auditing Without Commitment

Citations

Cited by:

1. Anna Maria Cristina Menichini, 2003. "Separation of functions, Collusion and Supervisors Financial Participation," CSEF Working Papers 109, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
2. Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," Working Papers 202202, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
   • Jacopo Bizzotto & Alessandro De Chiara, 2022. "Frequent audits and honest audits," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2022/417, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
3. M. Martin Boyer, 2007. "Resistance (to Fraud) Is Futile," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 461-492, June.
4. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Tradeable-permit pollution control systems with and without commitment to auditing," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 7(1), pages 15-37, March.
5. Wai‐Hong Ho & Yong Wang, 2013. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(2), pages 611-633, May.
6. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2014. "Fraudulent Claims and Nitpicky Insurers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(9), pages 2900-2917, September.
   • Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2012. "Fraudulent Claims and Nitpicky Insurers," Working Papers hal-00675106, HAL.
   • Jean Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2014. "Fraudulent claims and nitpicky insurers," Post-Print hal-01173052, HAL.
7. Suzanne H. Bijkerk & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Otto H. Swank, 2013. "Aggressive Reporting and Probabilistic Auditing in a Principles-Based Environment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-131/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
8. Kim, Doyoung, 2013. "Delegation of information verification," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 488-500.
9. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel F Garrett, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(5), pages 1654-1686.
   • Garrett, Daniel & Dilmé, Francesc, 2015. "Residual Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 10994, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Garrett, Daniel F. & Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Residual Deterrence," TSE Working Papers 19-1029, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
10. Kirchmaier, Thomas & Selvaggi, Mariano, 2006. "The dark side of 'good' corporate governance: compliance-fuelled book-cooking activities," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24513, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
11. Ralph-C. Bayer, 2006. "Finding Out Who The Crooks Are — Tax Evasion With Sequential Auditing," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 51(02), pages 195-227.
    • Ralph-C Bayer, 2003. "Finding out Who the Crooks Are – Tax Evasion with Sequential Auditing," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2003-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Ralph C Bayer, 2004. "Finding out who the crooks are - Tax evasion with sequential auditing," Public Economics 0412009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Ralph-C Bayer, 2004. "Finding Out Who the Crooks Are - Tax Evasion with Sequential Auditing," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2004-10, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
12. Isabelle Brocas, 2005. "Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(2), pages 317-346, May.
13. Domenico De Giovanni & Fabio Lamantia & Mario Pezzino, 2018. "Evolutionary Tax Evasion and Optimal Regulation," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1814, Economics, The University of Manchester.
14. Bayer, Ralph-C., 2006. "A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1071-1104, July.
    • Ralph-C Bayer, 2003. "A Contest with the Taxman: The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2003-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Ralph-C Bayer, 2004. "A Contest with the Taxman - The Impact of Tax Rates on Tax Evasion and Wastefully Invested Resources," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2004-11, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    • Ralph C Bayer, 2004. "A contest with the taxman - The impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources," Public Economics 0412010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
15. Anna Maria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2014. "Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(2), pages 339-376, October.
    • Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Oct 2012.
16. Albert Choi & George Triantis, 2008. "Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(2), pages 503-534, June.
17. Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012. "Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
    • Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers 200910, CERDI.
    • Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2012. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Post-Print halshs-00726067, HAL.
    • Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
18. M. Martin Boyer, 2000. "Centralizing Insurance Fraud Investigation*," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 25(2), pages 159-178, December.
19. De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017. "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 172-186.
    • Alessandro De Chiara & Luca Livio, 2015. "The Threat of Corruption and the Optimal Supervisory Task," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
20. Miguel Braun & Rafael Di tella, 2004. "Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 77-100, March.
21. Maurizio Caserta & Livio Ferrante & Francesco Reito, 2022. "Bribes and Bureaucracy Size: The Strategy of Watering Down Corruption," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 191-213, January.
22. Guillaume Roger, 2013. "Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 55-80, November.
    • Guillaume Roger, 2011. "Optimal contract under moral hazard with soft information," Discussion Papers 2012-12, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
23. Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
24. Giovanni, Domenico De & Lamantia, Fabio & Pezzino, Mario, 2019. "A behavioral model of evolutionary dynamics and optimal regulation of tax evasion," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 79-89.
25. M. Martin Boyer, 2004. "Overcompensation as a Partial Solution to Commitment and Renegotiation Problems: The Case of Ex Post Moral Hazard," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 71(4), pages 559-582, December.
26. Anna Maria C. Menichini & Peter J. Simmons, 2017. "Efficient audits by pooling projects," Discussion Papers 17/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
27. Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo & Jack A. Nickerson, 2011. "Regulator Heterogeneity and Endogenous Efforts to Close the Information Asymmetry Gap," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 25-54.
28. Porteiro, Nicolas, 2008. "Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 156-175, January.
    • Porteiro, Nicol?, 2001. "Pressure Groups and Experts in Environmental Regulation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 491.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
29. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
    • Roland Strausz, "undated". "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Papers 021, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 27, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
30. Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," CERDI Working papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
31. M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-29, CIRANO.
32. Alexander Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Mixed up? that’s good for motivation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 107-125, January.
    • Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2004. "Mixed up? That's good for motivation," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/22, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Sep 2004.
    • Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloic, 2004. "Mixed Up? That's Good for Motivation," IZA Discussion Papers 1331, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
33. Kim, Doyoung, 2006. "Capital budgeting for new projects: On the role of auditing in information acquisition," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 257-270, September.
34. Bontems, Philippe & Bourgeon, Jean-Marc, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 409-435, February.
    • P. Bontems & J-M. Bourgeon, 2000. "Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement Policy," THEMA Working Papers 2000-56, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    • Philippe Bontems & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 2005. "Optimal environmental taxation and enforcement policy [Inspection et taxation optimales des émissions polluantes]," Post-Print hal-02683203, HAL.
35. Annamaria Menichini, 2000. "Third parties as an incentive to comply," CSEF Working Papers 41, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jan 2006.
36. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
37. Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-2383, October.
    • Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," UC3M Working papers. Economics we096742, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00710639, HAL.
    • Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
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    • Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00710639, HAL.
    • Martimort, David & Ivaldi, Marc & Gagnepain, Philippe, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00710639, HAL.
38. Anke S. Kessler, 2004. "Optimal Auditing in Hierarchical Relationships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(2), pages 210-231, June.
39. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.
    • Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 0006, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    • Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2000. "CATCHING THE AGENT ON THE WRONG FOOT: ex post choice of monitoring," Working Papers 0006, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
40. Thierry Pénard & Saïd Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 66, pages 209-233.
    • Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 1999. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Working Papers 99-26, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    • Thierry Pénard & S. Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Post-Print halshs-00069687, HAL.
41. Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2016. "The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 49(3), pages 399-427, November.
    • Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Phillipe, 2009. "Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants," Working Papers 2009-21, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
42. M. Boyer, 2003. "Contracting under ex post moral hazard and non-commitment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 1-38, August.
    • M. Martin Boyer, 2001. "Contracting under Ex Post Moral Hazard and Non-Commitment," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-30, CIRANO.
43. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00710639 is not listed on IDEAS
44. Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2005. "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(3), pages 583-599, September.
    • Anastasios Xepapadeas, "undated". "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
45. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 89-107, January.
    • Roland Strausz, "undated". "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Papers 015, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 33, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
46. Anastasios Xepapadeas & Constadina Passa, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 0403, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
    • Constadina Passa & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2004. "Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach," Working Papers 2004.67, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
47. Andreas Asseyer, "undated". "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015002, Berlin School of Economics.
48. Finkle, Aaron & Shin, Dongsoo, 2007. "Conducting inaccurate audits to commit to the audit policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 379-389, April.
49. Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2008. "Third Parties, Information Disclosure And Monitoring Incentives," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(1), pages 31-50, February.
50. WaiHong Ho & Yong Wang, 2013. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment, and Economic Growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 46(2), pages 611-633, May.
    • Ho, Wai-Hong & Wang, Yong, 2008. "Asymmetric Information, Auditing Commitment and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 17469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
51. Jean-Jacques Laffont, 2003. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 12(Supplemen), pages 193-211, September.
    • Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Enforcement, Regulation and Development," IDEI Working Papers 129, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
52. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
53. Marina Halac & Andrea Prat, 2016. "Managerial Attention and Worker Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(10), pages 3104-3132, October.
54. Harold L. Cole, 2008. "Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims," NBER Working Papers 14480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Harold L. Cole, 2008. "Self-Enforcing Stochastic Monitoring and the Separation of Debt and Equity Claims," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-025, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
55. Prat, Andrea & Halac, Marina, 2014. "Managerial Attention and Worker Engagement," CEPR Discussion Papers 10035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
56. David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2020. "Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 409-444, September.
    • Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Gromb, Denis & Bardey, David, 2019. "Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 13543, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    • David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2020. "Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02973307, HAL.
57. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment," Working papers 175, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
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58. Taylor, Curt, 2004. "Privacy and Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt5hk0k89w, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
59. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10489, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
60. Ichino, Andrea & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008. "How often should you open the door?: Optimal monitoring to screen heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 820-831, September.
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62. Jeremy M. Burke & Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 2012. "Information Acquisition in Competitive Markets: An Application to the US Mortgage Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 65-106, November.
63. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2008. "Upcoding and Optimal Auditing in Health Care (or The economics of DRG creep)," CEPR Discussion Papers 6689, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
64. Mitusch, Kay, 2006. "Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 507-525, August.
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66. Patrick Leoni, "undated". "Banking Regulation without Commitment to Audit," IEW - Working Papers 251, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
67. Shin, Dongsoo & Yun, Sungho, 2004. "Choice of technology in outsourcing: an endogenous information structure," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 165-178, June.
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69. Boyer, Martin, 2001. "Les clauses de valeur à neuf sont-elles optimales?," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 77(1), pages 53-74, mars.
70. Hsiao-Chi Chen & Shi-Miin Liu, 2005. "Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 85(2), pages 107-139, August.
71. Stefan ARPING,, 2002. "Playing Hardball: Relationship Banking in the Age of Credit Derivatives," FAME Research Paper Series rp49, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering.
72. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarrée, 2006. "Incentives For Corruptible Auditors In The Absence Of Commitment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 269-291, June.
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74. Asseyer, Andreas, 2018. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 222-252.
75. Sheriff, Glenn & Osgood, Daniel E., 2005. "Shepherd's Dilemma," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19340, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
76. Roland Strausz, 2001. "Mitigating Non-Contractability with Interim Randomization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 231-245, June.
77. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stephane, 2003. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3011, The World Bank.
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78. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
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79. Guasch, J. Luis & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Straub, Stéphane, 2008. "Renegotiation of concession contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the water and transport sectors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 421-442, March.
80. Nguyen, Anh & Tan, Teck Yong, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion with costly messages," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
81. Han, Wenqing & Liu, Shi-Miin & Chen, Hsiao-Chi, 2020. "Optimal concession contracts for landlord port authorities under incomplete information," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 113-127.
82. Jonathan Pogach, 2010. "Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts," 2010 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
83. Kessler, Anke & Lülfesmann, Christoph & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 3428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
84. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
85. Choe, Chongwoo, 1998. "Contract design and costly verification games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 327-340, February.
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