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Playing Hardball: Relationship Banking in the Age of Credit Derivatives


  • Stefan ARPING,

    (University of Lausanne)


This paper develops a contracting framework in order to explore the effects of credit derivatives on banks’ incentives to monitor loans, their incentives to intervene, and, ultimately, borrowers’ incentives to perform. We show that (i) credit derivatives with short term maturity strengthen incentives to intervene, incentives to monitor, and managerial incentives to perform; (ii) while credit derivatives with long term maturity weaken incentives to intervene, intervention incentives can be maintained by sourcing more short term credit insurance; (iii) long term credit insurance nevertheless weakens managerial incentives through a dilution effect. These findings suggest that properly designed credit derivatives strengthen monitoring incentives and result in efficiency gains, rather than impeding economic efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan ARPING,, 2002. "Playing Hardball: Relationship Banking in the Age of Credit Derivatives," FAME Research Paper Series rp49, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering.
  • Handle: RePEc:fam:rpseri:rp49

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    1. Carlstrom, Charles T. & Samolyk, Katherine A., 1995. "Loan sales as a response to market-based capital constraints," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 627-646, June.
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    3. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    4. Besanko, David & Kanatas, George, 1993. "Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 213-232.
    5. Duffee, Gregory R. & Zhou, Chunsheng, 2001. "Credit derivatives in banking: Useful tools for managing risk?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 25-54, August.
    6. Fahad Khalil, 1997. "Auditing Without Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 629-640, Winter.
    7. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. " Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    8. Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-744, Winter.
    9. John Kiff & Jennifer A. Elliott & Elias G. Kazarian & Jodi G. Scarlata & Carolyne Spackman, 2009. "Credit Derivatives; Systemic Risks and Policy Options?," IMF Working Papers 09/254, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Titman, Sheridan, 1984. "The effect of capital structure on a firm's liquidation decision," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 137-151, March.
    11. Froot, Kenneth A. & Stein, Jeremy C., 1998. "Risk management, capital budgeting, and capital structure policy for financial institutions: an integrated approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 55-82, January.
    12. Rajan, Raghuram & Winton, Andrew, 1995. " Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1113-1146, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Parlour, Christine A. & Winton, Andrew, 2013. "Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 25-45.

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