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Lending Relationships and the Collateral Channel

Author

Listed:
  • Gareth Anderson

    () (Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM)
    University of Oxford)

  • Saleem Bahaj

    () (Bank of England
    Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM))

  • Matthieu Chavaz

    () (Bank of England)

  • Angus Foulis

    () (Bank of England
    Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM))

  • Gabor Pinter

    () (Bank of England
    Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM))

Abstract

This paper shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from shocks to collateral values. We construct a novel database covering the banking relationships of UK firms, as well as those of their board members and executives. We find that the sensitivity of corporate investment to shocks to real estate collateral value is halved when the length of the bank-firm relationship increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. This effect is substantially reduced for firms whose executives have a personal mortgage relationship with their firm’s bank. Our findings provide support for theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Gareth Anderson & Saleem Bahaj & Matthieu Chavaz & Angus Foulis & Gabor Pinter, 2018. "Lending Relationships and the Collateral Channel," Discussion Papers 1813, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
  • Handle: RePEc:cfm:wpaper:1813
    as

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    File URL: http://www.centreformacroeconomics.ac.uk/Discussion-Papers/2018/CFMDP2018-13-Paper.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Saleem Bahaj & Angus Foulis & Gabor Pinter, 2017. "Home Values and Firm Behaviour," Discussion Papers 1724, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    2. Neil Mehrotra & Nicolas Crouzet, 2017. "Small and Large Firms over the Business Cycle," 2017 Meeting Papers 600, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Mehrotra, Neil & Crouzet, Nicolas, 2017. "Small and Large Firms over the Business Cycle," Working Papers 741, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    4. Gabriel Jimenez & Steven Ongena & Jose-Luis Peydro & Jesus Saurina, 2012. "Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(5), pages 2301-2326, August.
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    8. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2000. "Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 324-351, April.
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    10. Gan, Jie, 2007. "Collateral, debt capacity, and corporate investment: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 709-734, September.
    11. Berger, Allen N. & Scott Frame, W. & Ioannidou, Vasso, 2011. "Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 85-97, April.
    12. Froot, Kenneth A & Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. " Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1629-1658, December.
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    17. Flannery, Mark J, 1986. " Asymmetric Information and Risky Debt Maturity Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 41(1), pages 19-37, March.
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    19. Ryan Niladri Banerjee & Kristian S Blickle, 2016. "Housing collateral and small firm activity in Europe," BIS Working Papers 575, Bank for International Settlements.
    20. Hans Degryse & Artashes Karapetyan & Sudipto Karmakar, 2018. "To Ask or Not To Ask? Collateral versus Screening in Lending Relationships," Working Papers REM 2018/49, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
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    Cited by:

    1. Saleem Bahaj & Angus Foulis & Gabor Pinter & Paolo Surico, 2018. "Employment and the Collateral Channel of Monetary Policy," Discussion Papers 1832, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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