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How Management Risk Affects Corporate Debt

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  • Yihui Pan
  • Tracy Yue Wang
  • Michael S Weisbach

Abstract

We evaluate whether management risk, which arises from investors’ uncertainty about management’s added value, affects firms’ default risks and debt pricing. We find that, regardless of the reason for the turnover, CDS, loan, and bond yield spreads increase at the time of management turnover, when management risk is highest, and decline over the first three years of the new CEO’s tenure. The effects increase with prior investor uncertainty about the new management. These results are consistent with the view that management risk affects firms’ default risk. An understanding of management risk yields a number of implications for corporate finance. Received May 15, 2016; editorial decision February 27, 2017 by Editor David Denis.

Suggested Citation

  • Yihui Pan & Tracy Yue Wang & Michael S Weisbach, 2018. "How Management Risk Affects Corporate Debt," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(9), pages 3491-3531.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:31:y:2018:i:9:p:3491-3531.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx071
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    Cited by:

    1. Ismailescu, Iuliana & Col, Burcin, 2022. "Cross-border M&As and credit risk: Evidence from the CDS market," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 51-73.
    2. Pham, Mia Hang, 2020. "In law we trust: Lawyer CEOs and stock liquidity," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    3. Zhi Li & Lingling Wang & Karen Wruck, 2020. "Accounting‐Based Compensation and Debt Contracts," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(3), pages 1475-1511, September.
    4. Shang, Chenguang, 2021. "Dare to play with fire? Managerial ability and the use of short-term debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    5. Cao, June & Ee, Mong Shan & Hasan, Iftekhar & Huang, He, 2024. "Asymmetric reactions of abnormal audit fees jump to credit rating changes," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2).
    6. Jeong‐Bon Kim & Jeff J. Wang & Eliza Xia Zhang, 2021. "Does real earnings smoothing reduce investors’ perceived risk?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(9-10), pages 1560-1595, October.
    7. Braga-Alves, Marcus V. & Ismailescu, Iuliana & Sen, Kaustav, 2022. "Powerful CEOs and their legacy: Evidence from credit risk around CEO turnovers," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 345-358.
    8. Wang, Yanyan & He, Xubiao, 2024. "Competence enhancement from interactive learning: Does attending conferences affect CEO turnover?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    9. Gareth Anderson & Saleem Bahaj & Matthieu Chavaz & Angus Foulis & Gabor Pinter, 2023. "Lending Relationships and the Collateral Channel," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(3), pages 851-887.
    10. Hyeongjun Kim & Hoon Cho & Doojin Ryu, 2022. "Corporate Bankruptcy Prediction Using Machine Learning Methodologies with a Focus on Sequential Data," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 59(3), pages 1231-1249, March.
    11. Hoang Vu, Ngan & Dang, Ha V. & Nguyen, Hung T. & Pham, Mia Hang, 2025. "Upholding integrity: The influence of executives’ backgrounds on corporate information environment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C).
    12. Cai, Xiangshang & Gao, Yang & Wu, Zhiting & Yuan, Jiayi, 2024. "Chief executive officer marital status and corporate credit ratings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 95(PA).
    13. Tan, Changchun & Mo, Lingyu & Wu, Xiaomeng & Zhou, Peng, 2024. "Fintech development and corporate credit risk: Evidence from an emerging market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    14. Benz, Andreas & Demerjian, Peter R. & Hoang, Daniel & Ruckes, Martin E., 2024. "Picking winners: Managerial ability and capital allocation," Working Paper Series in Economics 163, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    15. Chen, Tsung-Kang & Tseng, Yijie & Hung, Yu-Shun & Huang, Mei-Ling, 2023. "Management efficiency uncertainty and its implications for bondholders," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 73-92.
    16. Brian Akins & David De Angelis & Maclean Gaulin, 2020. "Debt Contracting on Management," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(4), pages 2095-2137, August.
    17. Wang, Yangmei & Guo, Savannah (Yuanyuan), 2025. "How does the CEO horizon problem affect the cost of bank loans?," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    18. Dutton, Joseph & Lockwood, Matthew, 2017. "Ideas, institutions and interests in the politics of cross-border electricity interconnection: Greenlink, Britain and Ireland," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 375-385.
    19. Nguyen, Harvey & Pham, Mia Hang & Vu, Van Hoang, 2025. "Executives’ early-life experience and corporate debt contracting: Evidence from CEO military experience," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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