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Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information

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  • Langinier, Corinne
  • Marcoul, Philippe

Abstract

This paper examines the strategic non-revelation of information by innovators when applying for patents. The lack of accessible prior art (i.e., an existing set of related inventions) may be responsible for the granting of questionable patents by examiners. In a model of a bilateral search of information we show that an innovator can conceal some information to increase the probability of being granted a patent, and the examiner makes her screening intensity contingent upon the level of prior art transmitted. We then analyze the effects of two policy changes: an existing one, called the Second Pair of Eyes Review, and another in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. Even though the implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy that involves equal screening intensity across all applications requires a limited commitment power from the examiner and induces truthful information transmission.

Suggested Citation

  • Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2007. "Patents, Search of Prior Art, and Revelation of Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10489, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:10489
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Florian Schuett, 2013. "Patent quality and incentives at the patent office," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(2), pages 313-336, June.
    2. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2020. "Monetary and implicit incentives of patent examiners," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    3. Atal, Vidya & Bar, Talia, 2010. "Prior art: To search or not to search," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(5), pages 507-521, September.
    4. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Pierre M. Picard, 2011. "Patent office Governance and Patent System Quality," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2011-007, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Picard, Pierre M. & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2013. "Patent office governance and patent examination quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 14-25.
    6. Régibeau, P & Rockett, K & Mariam, S, 2012. "Patent Pendency, Learning Effects, and Innovation Importance at the US Patent Office," Economics Discussion Papers 2863, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    7. Johnson, Justin P., 2014. "Defensive publishing by a leading firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 15-27.

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