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Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality

Author

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  • Pierre M. Picard

    () (Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg (Luxembourg), and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium).)

  • Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie

    () (Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), SBS-EM, ECARES, CEB, DULBEA, CEPR and Bruegel)

Abstract

The present paper discusses the role of quality in patent systems from the perspective of patent offices' behavior and organization. After documenting original stylized facts, the paper presents a model in which patent offices set patent fees and the quality level of their examination processes. Various objectives of patent offices' governors are considered. We show that the quality of the patent system is maximal for the patent offices that maximises either the social welfare or its own proffit. Quality is lower for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of patent applications and even smaller for the self-funded patent office maximizing the number of granted patents. A labor union improves examination quality and may compensate for the potentialy inappropriate objectives of patent office management.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre M. Picard & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2011. "Patent Office Governance and Patent System Quality," CREA Discussion Paper Series 11-06, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:11-06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Belleflamme,Paul & Peitz,Martin, 2015. "Industrial Organization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107687899.
    2. Danguy, Jérôme & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2010. "The R&D-patent relationship: An industry perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 8145, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    Cited by:

    1. de Saint-Georges, Matthis & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2013. "A quality index for patent systems," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 704-719.
    2. Picard, Pierre M. & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2013. "Patent office governance and patent examination quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 14-25.
    3. Fabien Girard, 2015. "‘Though the treasure of nature’s germens tumble all together’: the EPO and patents on native traits or the bewitching powers of ideologies," Prometheus, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 43-65, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Patent system; quality; intellectual property; public firm organization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L30 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - General
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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