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Equilibria in open common value auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 395-409, November.
  2. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
  3. Bajoori, Elnaz & Vermeulen, Dries, 2019. "Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 47-56.
  4. Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Jorg Borrmann & Michaela Schaffhauser-Linzatti, 2008. "Franchise bidding with differences in demand," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(11), pages 849-852.
  6. Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023. "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers EPRG2310, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
  7. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  8. Tietze, Frank, 2008. "Technology market intermediaries to facilitate external technology exploitation: The case of IP auctions," Working Papers 55, Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Institute for Technology and Innovation Management.
  9. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
  10. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
  11. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
  12. Mun Chuia & David Porter & Stephen Rassenti & Vernon Smith, 2011. "The Effect of Bidding Information in Ascending Auctions," Working Papers 11-13, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  13. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
  14. Kagel, John H., 1995. "Cross-game learning: Experimental evidence from first-price and English common value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 163-170, August.
  15. Mezzetti, Claudio & Tsetlin, Ilia, 2008. "On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(9-10), pages 1040-1048, September.
  16. Sommervoll, Dag Einar, 2020. "Jump bids in real estate auctions," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
  17. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 042008, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
  18. Theo Offerman & Giorgia Romagnoli & Andreas Ziegler, 2022. "Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 787-823, May.
  19. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.
  20. Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003. "An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 295-316, September.
  21. Evans, Lewis & Mellsop, James, 2003. "Exchanging Price Information can be Efficient: per se offences should be legilsated very sparingly," Working Paper Series 18988, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  22. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
  23. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 1998. "The English Auction Is Optimal Among Simple Sequential Auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 144-166, September.
  24. McAdams, David, 2007. "Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 144-166, September.
  25. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Haile, Philip A. & Riley, John G., 2002. "Symmetric Separating Equilibria in English Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 19-27, January.
  26. Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2001. "Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 219-240, August.
  27. Evans, Lewis & Mellsop, James, 2003. "Exchanging Price Information can be Efficient: per se offences should be legilsated very sparingly," Working Paper Series 3890, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
  28. Xinyu Li & Marco Haan & Sander Onderstal & Jasper Veldman, 2023. "A Wind Tunnel Test of Wind Farm Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-046/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
  29. Choi, Syngjoo & Guerra, José-Alberto & Kim, Jinwoo, 2019. "Interdependent value auctions with insider information: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 218-237.
  30. repec:eid:wpaper:37904 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2002. "Prices and the Winner's Curse," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(1), pages 1-21, Spring.
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