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Medidas Pro-Competencia de la Reforma Previsional

Author

Listed:
  • Gonzalo Reyes
  • Rubén Castro

    (Studies Division, Chilean Pension Supervisor)

Abstract

La Reforma Previsional recientemente aprobada introduce una serie de medidas que aumentan la competitividad con que opera la industria de AFP. Este artículo resume el análisis realizado en la elaboración y diseño de tales medidas, partiendo por un diagnóstico acabado del nivel de competencia de la industria de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (AFP), y que incluye una descripción de su evolución competitiva en el tiempo. Adicionalmente, se describen las principales medidas incluidas en la reforma y se estima el impacto potencial que éstas podrían generar en la industria en los casos más relevantes. En particular, la licitación de carteras de afiliados, la separación de funciones y los cambios en el Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia, junto a las modificaciones en la estructura de comisiones, tienen el potencial necesario para generar un mercado previsional más eficiente y competitivo, lo que en definitiva se debería traducir en menores costos y mejores condiciones de servicio para los afiliados..

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Reyes & Rubén Castro, 2008. "Medidas Pro-Competencia de la Reforma Previsional," Working Papers 29, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Dec 2008.
    • Handle: RePEc:sdp:sdpwps:29
    as

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    File URL: https://repec.spensiones.cl/repec/3_doctrabajos/29_2008_medidas_procompetencia_reforma_previsional.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2008
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Solange Berstein Jáuregui & Carolina Cabrita Felix, 2007. "Los determinantes de la elección de AFP en Chile: nueva evidencia a partir de datos individuales," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 34(1 Year 20), pages 53-72, June.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-286, July.
    4. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    5. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Reyes, Gonzalo, 2010. "Market design for the provision of social insurance: the case of disability and survivors insurance in Chile," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 421-444, July.
    2. Gonzalo Reyes, 2009. "Diseño de mercado para la provisión de Seguridad Social: El Caso del Seguro de Invalidez y Sobrevivencia," Working Papers 30, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Sep 2009.
    3. Rofman, Rafael & Fajnzylber, Eduardo & Herrera, Germán, 2010. "Reforming the pension reforms: Argentina and Chile," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    4. María Angélica Arbeláez & Jorge Humberto Botero & Alejandra González & Camila Salamanca, 2011. "Sostenibilidad del seguro previsional en Colombia," Working Papers Series. Documentos de Trabajo 9066, Fedesarrollo.

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    Keywords

    Competencia; sistema de pensiones;

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