A dynamic common-property resource problem with potential regime shifts
This paper provides a general framework with which a dynamic problem with potential regime shifts can be analyzed in a strategic environment as well as from social planner’s perspective. A typical situation described by such a game is the joint exploitation of a common-property resource such as lakes, forests, marine fish populations, and at a larger scale the global climate system. By applying the framework to a simple dynamic common-property resource problem, we show that when the risk is endogenous, potential of regime shifts can facilitate precautionary management of common-property resources even in a strategic environment. It is also shown that there exists a resource-depletion trap in which a regime shift, once it happens, triggers a reversal of resource accumulation dynamics, possibly leading to a collapse of resource base.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
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