IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/drm/wpaper/2011-38.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Bassanini
  • Eve Caroli
  • Antoine Rebérioux
  • Thomas Breda

Abstract

We study compensation packages in family and non-family firms. Using French matched employer-employee data, we first show that family firms pay on average lower wages. We find that part of this wage gap is due to low wage workers sorting into family firms and high wage workers sorting into non-family firms. However, we also find evidence that company wage policies differ according to ownership status, so that the same worker is paid differently under family and non-family firm ownership. We also find evidence that family firms are characterised by lower job insecurity, as measured by dismissal rates and by the subjective risk of dismissal perceived by workers. In addition, family firms appear to rely less on dismissals – and more on hiring reductions – than non-family firms when they downsize. We show that compensating wage differentials account for a substantial part of the inverse relationship between the family/non-family gaps in wages and job security.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Bassanini & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux & Thomas Breda, 2011. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-38, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
  • Handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-38
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://economix.fr/pdf/dt/2011/WP_EcoX_2011-38.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph G. Altonji & Todd E. Elder & Christopher R. Taber, 2005. "Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(1), pages 151-184, February.
    2. Andrew Clark & Fabien Postel-Vinay, 2009. "Job security and job protection," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 207-239, April.
    3. Cronqvist, Henrik & Nilsson, Mattias, 2003. "Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(4), pages 695-719, December.
    4. Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2007. "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1351-1408.
    5. Chad Syverson, 2011. "What Determines Productivity?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 326-365, June.
    6. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2015. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(3), pages 623-681.
    7. John M. Abowd & Patrick Corbel & Francis Kramarz, 1999. "The Entry And Exit Of Workers And The Growth Of Employment: An Analysis Of French Establishments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 170-187, May.
    8. Randall Morck & David Stangeland & Bernard Yeung, 2000. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control, and Economic Growth The Canadian Disease?," NBER Chapters, in: Concentrated Corporate Ownership, pages 319-372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. John M. Abowd & Francis Kramarz & David N. Margolis, 1999. "High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 251-334, March.
    10. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2010. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Working Papers halshs-00564972, HAL.
    11. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling, Experience, and Earnings," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number minc74-1.
    12. Morck, Randall K. (ed.), 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226536781.
    13. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen & Francisco Perez-Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2007. "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 647-691.
    14. Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2009. "Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 439-466, April.
    15. Stephen Nickell & Patricia Jones & Glenda Quintini, 2002. "A Picture of Job Insecurity Facing British Men," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 1-27, January.
    16. Valletta, Robert G, 1999. "Declining Job Security," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(4), pages 170-197, October.
    17. Holger M. Mueller & Thomas Philippon, 2011. "Family Firms and Labor Relations," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 218-245, April.
    18. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1979. "Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 972-990, October.
    19. Francisco Pérez-González, 2006. "Inherited Control and Firm Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1559-1588, December.
    20. Randall K. Morck, 2000. "Concentrated Corporate Ownership," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc00-1.
    21. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, 2001. "How To Compete: The Impact Of Workplace Practices And Information Technology On Productivity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 434-445, August.
    22. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    23. David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2007. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms: Evidence from the French Stock Market," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(4), pages 709-751, June.
    24. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    25. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Lang, Larry H. P., 2000. "The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 81-112.
    26. Jacob A. Mincer, 1974. "Schooling and Earnings," NBER Chapters, in: Schooling, Experience, and Earnings, pages 41-63, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    28. Steven J. Davis & R. Jason Faberman & John Haltiwanger, 2006. "The Flow Approach to Labor Markets: New Data Sources and Micro-Macro Links," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(3), pages 3-26, Summer.
    29. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pb:p:2485-2563 is not listed on IDEAS
    30. Bianco, Madga & Golinelli, Roberto & Parigi, Giuseppe, 2009. "Family firms and investments," MPRA Paper 19247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    31. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    32. Böckerman, Petri & Ilmakunnas, Pekka & Johansson, Edvard, 2011. "Job security and employee well-being: Evidence from matched survey and register data," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 547-554, August.
    33. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    34. Leandro D’Aurizio & Livio Romano, 2011. "Family Firms and the Great Recession: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?," Economics Working Papers ECO2011/28, European University Institute.
    35. Steven J. Davis & John C. Haltiwanger & Scott Schuh, 1998. "Job Creation and Destruction," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262540932, April.
    36. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    37. Patrick Aubert & Eve Caroli & Muriel Roger, 2006. "New technologies, organisation and age: firm-level evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(509), pages 73-93, February.
    38. Belén Villalonga & Raphael Amit, 2010. "Family Control of Firms and Industries," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 863-904, September.
    39. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2006. "The Role of Family in Family Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    40. Michael Pries & Richard Rogerson, 2005. "Hiring Policies, Labor Market Institutions, and Labor Market Flows," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 811-839, August.
    41. Block, Jörn Hendrich, 2008. "Family management, family ownership and downsizing: Evidence from S&P 500 firms," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2008-023, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    42. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Family firms are like public employers
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-10-20 18:30:00

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Employment and Wage Insurance within Firms: Worldwide Evidence," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(4), pages 1298-1340.
    2. Kölling, Arnd, 2016. "Family Firms and Labor Demand: Size Matters – But Only the Small Ones are Different," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145471, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Renata Lemos & Daniela Scur, 2018. "All in the family? CEO choice and firm organization," CEP Discussion Papers dp1528, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    4. Block, Jörn & Goerke, Laszlo & Millán, José María & Román, Concepción, 2014. "Family employees and absenteeism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 94-99.
    5. Leandro D’Aurizio & Livio Romano, 2011. "Family Firms and the Great Recession: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?," Economics Working Papers ECO2011/28, European University Institute.
    6. Bach, Laurent & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas, 2015. "CEO identity and labor contracts: Evidence from CEO transitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 227-242.
    7. repec:zbw:imbwps:90 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Munkacsi, Zsuzsa, 2015. "Fiscal austerity, unemployment and family firms," Discussion Papers 06/2015, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    9. Siebert, W. Stanley & Peng, Fei & Maimaiti, Yasheng, 2011. "HRM Practices and Performance of Family-Run Workplaces: Evidence from the 2004 WERS," IZA Discussion Papers 5899, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. D'Aurizio, Leandro & Oliviero, Tommaso & Romano, Livio, 2015. "Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a financial crisis," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 279-292.
    11. Scur, Daniela & Lemos, Renata, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    13. Mohnen, Alwine & Mückenhausen, Verena & Toporova, Nevena & Kern, Maximilian, 2021. "Personalmanagement in Familienunternehmen: Recruiting, Arbeitsbedingungen, Weiterbildung," Studien, Stiftung Familienunternehmen / Foundation for Family Businesses, number 250040, March.
    14. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2010. "Working in family firms: less paid but more secure? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Working Papers halshs-00564972, HAL.
    15. Backman, Mikaela & Palmberg, Johanna, 2015. "Contextualizing small family firms: How does the urban–rural context affect firm employment growth?," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 247-258.
    16. Joern H. Block & José María Millán & Concepción Román & Haibo Zhou, 2015. "Job Satisfaction and Wages of Family Employees," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(2), pages 183-207, March.
    17. Bjuggren, Carl Magnus, 2015. "Sensitivity to shocks and implicit employment protection in family firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 18-31.
    18. Ferrari, Filippo, 2013. "'The employees are all equal... but some are more equals than others'. Altruism, opportunism and discrimination in family SMEs," MPRA Paper 52391, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrea Bassanini & Thomas Breda & Eve Caroli & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Working in Family Firms: Paid Less but More Secure? Evidence from French Matched Employer-Employee Data," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 66(2), pages 433-466, April.
    2. William Mullins & Antoinette Schoar, 2013. "How do CEOs see their Role? Management Philosophy and Styles in Family and Non-Family Firms," NBER Working Papers 19395, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Saito, Takuji, 2008. "Family firms and firm performance: Evidence from Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 620-646, December.
    4. Scur, Daniela & Lemos, Renata, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Suveera Gill & Parmjit Kaur, 2015. "Family Involvement in Business and Financial Performance: A Panel Data Analysis," Vikalpa: The Journal for Decision Makers, , vol. 40(4), pages 395-420, December.
    6. Maria Rosaria Carillo & Vincenzo Lombardo & Alberto Zazzaro, 2013. "Family Firm Connections and Entrepreneurial Human Capital in the Process of Development," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 89, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    7. François Belot & Timothée Waxin, 2017. "Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 591-617, December.
    8. Morck, Randall & Deniz Yavuz, M. & Yeung, Bernard, 2011. "Banking system control, capital allocation, and economy performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 264-283, May.
    9. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    10. González, Maximiliano & Guzmán, Alexander & Pombo, Carlos & Trujillo, María-Andrea, 2012. "Family firms and financial performance: The cost of growing," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 626-649.
    11. Fuxiu Jiang & Xiaojia Zheng & Wei Tang, 2018. "Non-family chair and corporate performance," Frontiers of Business Research in China, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 1-30, December.
    12. Mullins, William & Schoar, Antoinette, 2016. "How do CEOs see their roles? Management philosophies and styles in family and non-family firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 24-43.
    13. Laura Abrardi & Laura Rondi, 2020. "Ownership and performance in the Italian stock exchange: the puzzle of family firms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 47(4), pages 613-643, December.
    14. Oriana Bandiera & Renata Lemos & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2018. "Managing the Family Firm: Evidence from CEOs at Work," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(5), pages 1605-1653.
    15. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    16. Valentina Peruzzi, 2017. "Does family ownership structure affect investment-cash flow sensitivity? Evidence from Italian SMEs," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(43), pages 4378-4393, September.
    17. Ettore Crocia & John A. Doukas & Halit Gonenc, 2010. "Family Control and Financing Decisions," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1004, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
    18. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2014. "Are founding families special blockholders? An investigation of controlling shareholder influence on firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-16.
    19. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Jiang, Fuxiu & Jiang, Zhan & Kim, Kenneth A. & Zhang, Min, 2015. "Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 260-278.
    21. Di Giuli, Alberta & Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano, 2011. "Are small family firms financially sophisticated?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 2931-2944, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    family firms; wages; job security; compensating wage differentials; linked employer-employee data;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:drm:wpaper:2011-38. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Valerie Mignon (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/modemfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.