IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Family Firms and the Great Recession: Out of Sight, Out of Mind?

  • Leandro D’Aurizio
  • Livio Romano

The purpose of this paper is to study how family firms, compared to widely-held companies, reacted to the 2008 economic crisis in terms of employment adjustments. By using a difference-in-difference approach, we provide empirical evidence that di- vergent paths of adjustment between family and non-family firms exist, with family firms systematically preferring to safeguard workplaces close to the firm's headquarters, compared to other plants. We offer a new theoretical framework consistent with these findings, that we define the social recognition motive, based on the psychological rela- tion linking the family owner with his community of reference. We investigate possible alternative explanations for the results, most of whom can be ruled out in our setting. Finally, we test more directly for the validity of the social recognition theory, finding encouraging results in line with the predictions.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/18356/ECO_2011_28.pdf?sequence=3
File Function: main text
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by European University Institute in its series Economics Working Papers with number ECO2011/28.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/28
Contact details of provider: Postal: Badia Fiesolana, Via dei Roccettini, 9, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) Italy
Phone: +39-055-4685.982
Fax: +39-055-4685.902
Web page: http://www.eui.eu/ECO/

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November.
  2. David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2004. "Performance and Behavior of Family Firms : Evidence from the French Stock Market," Working Papers 2004-24, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  3. Andrew Clark & Andreas Knabe & Steffen Rätzel, 2009. "Unemployment as a Social Norm in Germany," Schmollers Jahrbuch : Journal of Applied Social Science Studies / Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 129(2), pages 251-260.
  4. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2012. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," CEP Discussion Papers dp1144, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-25, July.
  6. Federico Cingano & Paolo Pinotti, 2013. "Politicians At Work: The Private Returns And Social Costs Of Political Connections," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 433-465, 04.
  7. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
  8. Rebérioux, Antoine & Caroli, Eve & Breda, Thomas & Bassanini, Andrea, 2013. "Working in family firms : less paid but more secure ? Evidence from French matched employer-employee data," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/7244, Paris Dauphine University.
  9. Laurent Bach & Nicolas Serrano-Velarde, 2009. "The Power of Dynastic Commitment," Working Papers 0924, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  10. Mara Faccio, 2006. "Politically Connected Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 369-386, March.
  11. Michelacci, Claudio & Silva, Olmo, 2006. "Why So Many Local Entrepreneurs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5828, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Andrew Ellul & Marco Pagano & Fausto Panunzi, 2010. "Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2414-50, December.
  13. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2000. "The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development," NBER Working Papers 7563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  15. Favero, Carlo A. & Giglio, Stefano W & Honorati, Maddalena & Panunzi, Fausto, 2006. "The Performance of Italian Family Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5786, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Bianco, Madga & Golinelli, Roberto & Parigi, Giuseppe, 2009. "Family firms and investments," MPRA Paper 19247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA.
  18. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564972 is not listed on IDEAS
  19. Mark Granovetter, 2005. "The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 33-50, Winter.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2011/28. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Rhoda Lane)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.