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Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures

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  • Bedayo, Mikel
  • Jiménez, Gabriel
  • Peydró, José Luis
  • Vegas, Raquel

Abstract

We show that loan origination time is key for bank lending standards, cycles, defaults and failures. We exploit the credit register from Spain, with the time of a loan application and its granting. When VIX is lower (booms), banks shorten loan origination time, especially to riskier firms. Bank incentives (capital and competition), capacity constraints, and borrower-lender information asymmetries are key mechanisms driving results. Moreover, shorter (loan-level) origination time is associated with higher ex-post defaults, also using variation from holidays. Finally, shorter precrisis origination time -more than other lending conditions- is associated with more bank-level failures in crises, consistent with lower screening.

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  • Bedayo, Mikel & Jiménez, Gabriel & Peydró, José Luis & Vegas, Raquel, 2020. "Screening and Loan Origination Time: Lending Standards, Loan Defaults and Bank Failures," CEPR Discussion Papers 15445, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15445
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    1. van der Plaat, Mark & Spierdijk, Laura, 2020. "Recourse, asymmetric information, and credit risk over the business cycle," MPRA Paper 104718, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank failures; Credit cycles; Defaults; Lending standards; loan origination time; screening;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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