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The Desire for Impact

  • Robert Dur
  • Amihai Glazer

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make firms in a competitive labor market act as monopsonists, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different wages, may alleviate the hold-up problem in firm-specific investment, can make it profitable for an employer to give workers autonomy in effort or task choice, and can propagate shocks to unemployment.

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File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2005/wp-cesifo-2005-09/cesifo1_wp1535.pdf
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1535.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1535
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